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Abstract: Saul Kripke’s thought experiments on the reference of proper names
target the theory that the properties which identify a term’s referent are the subject
of an implicit agreement. Recently, survey versions of the experiments have been
thought to show that intuitions about reference are culturally contingent. Propos-
ing a revisionary interpretation, this article argues, first, that Kripke’s Cicero/
Feynman experiment reveals that every name user knows enough to be capable of
identifying the same individual as the name’s most informed users. Second, the
article shows that Kripke’s presentation of the Gödel/Jonah experiment is ambigu-
ous with respect to the properties attributed to the referent. Disambiguated, the
experiment fails to reveal that name users may be mistaken in every unique
property they attribute. Since the experiment’s ambiguity is replicated in survey
presentations, cross-cultural variation in survey response fails to show that intui-
tions about reference are culturally contingent.
Keywords: intuition, reference, descriptivism, experimental philosophy, proper
names.
Appealing to our intuition, philosophers make claims about who and
what terms refer to. These claims serve two purposes: to establish what a
good theory of reference ought to explain, and to establish platitudes that
distinguish the phenomenon of interest from (some or all) other phenom-
ena. One condition for the achievement of either purpose is that our
intuition provides an objective basis for discerning reference. The second
purpose depends, additionally, on the success of a particular theory of
reference, descriptivism, which states that the properties that identify a
term’s referent are the subject of an implicit agreement. Saul Kripke’s
thought experiments on the reference of proper names are variously inter-
preted as undermining one or both of these purposes. Traditionally, they
show that a term’s intuitive referent may not be identifiable through
any agreement about its properties. Recently, survey versions have been
thought to reveal that intuitions about reference are culturally contingent
(e.g., Machery et al. 2004), leaving claims about reference without an
objective basis.
Some philosophers argue that Kripke’s intuitions are in fact consistent
with descriptivism (e.g., Jackson 2010; Chalmers 2012). Others criticize
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the methodology of cross-cultural surveys (e.g., Ludwig 2007; Deutsch
2009; Marti 2009) and their focus on mere lay intuition (Williamson 2011;
Devitt 2011). But one assumption is unquestioned: that, granted Kripke’s
intuitions, his experiments show only how little speakers need to know.
This article challenges that assumption. I argue that, properly interpreted,
the Cicero/Feynman experiment discloses that name users know enough
about the referent to be capable of identifying the same individual as the
name’s most informed users. Second, I show that the Gödel/Jonah experi-
ment, the subject of surveys forming the basis of the critique of intuition,
features an ambiguity. Disambiguated, the experiment fails to reveal
(from the armchair, at least) that name users may be mistaken in every
unique property they attribute. Moreover, as the ambiguity is replicated in
survey versions, a culturally diverse survey response is not clearly attrib-
utable to culturally divergent intuition. Accordingly, an interpretation of
Kripke’s experiments as undermining either descriptivism or the objectiv-
ity of intuition itself is premature.
Cicero/Feynman: Ignorant Name Users?
Descriptivism states that the properties that identify a term’s referent are
the subject of an implicit agreement. If so, the most ignorant name user
ought to be capable of identifying the same individual as its most informed
users. To show how ignorant name users may be, Kripke observes that,
intuitively, people refer to Cicero without attributing any unique property
thereto: “[M]ost people, when they think of Cicero, just think of a famous
Roman orator, without any pretension to think either that there was only
one famous Roman orator or that one must know something else about
Cicero to have a referent for the name. . . . [T]he man in the street . . . will
say [of Richard Feynman]: well he’s a physicist or something” (Kripke
1980, 80). Ask most people who Cicero was, and they will be unable to
supply any unique attribute; yet they may still possess the name. As
Ichikawa, Maitra, and Weatherson put it, “[I]t isn’t that users think that
there was only one famous Roman orator. . . . It’s just that they don’t
know any more about the bearers of these names they possess” (2012, 61;
emphasis added).
Of course, it is one thing to show that speakers fail to attribute a unique
property, and another to show that they fail to attribute any whatsoever.
Thus, we would be hard pressed to credit possession of “Cicero” to
someone who does not even know that Cicero was a classical figure.
Similarly, if someone, describing “Einstein,” says only, “He’s a musician
or something,” we would be reluctant to recognise a use of the name. This
reluctance suggests that we expect name users to be able to say something
notable or interesting about the referent. The expectation is perceptible
in Kripke’s own examples. Of the causal-historical theory of reference,
Kripke observes: “[A] speaker who is on the far end of this [causal] chain,
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who has heard about say, Richard Feynman, in the market place or
elsewhere, may be referring to Richard Feynman even though he can’t
remember from whom he first heard of Feynman. He knows that
Feynman is a famous physicist” (1980, 91). Note the care to attribute
knowledge that the referent is a famous physicist. Intuitively, if all a
person attributed to the referent “Feynman” were fame as a soccer player,
he would not possess the name. Accordingly, Cicero/Feynman seems to
reveal that we expect every name user to attribute to the referent a prop-
erty distinguishing it from most other individuals.1
That a name user may identify the referent without associating a unique
achievement therewith is uncontroversial. The idea of a division of lin-
guistic labour has long been mooted as providing name users with the
capacity to identify an individual through those from whom they learnt
the name—for example: “[An associated description may] borrow its
credentials, as a genuinely identifying reference, from another, and that
from another’ (Strawson 1959, 182). The difficulty is that a referent
cannot be identified through those whose identity is itself forgotten or
misremembered. As Kripke observes, “You may not even remember from
whom you heard of Gödel” (1980, 90).2 However, a division of labour
need not be composed of chains of usage. The notion of functionally
specialized speakers is standardly deployed to account for natural kind
terms (Putnam 1973, 704–6; Horwich 1998, 86; Harman 1999, 219–20).
Hilary Putnam once ventured that proper names might equally have
specialists: “[T]he fact [is] that confirmation procedures for being gold, or
being aluminium, or being an elm tree, or being David are not the property
of every speaker—speakers defer to experts for the fixing of reference in a
huge number of cases (Putnam 1978, 114; emphasis added).
The suggestion is that a subset of name users identifies the referent on
behalf of all. As Michael Devitt warns, however, expert users “cannot
be identified simply as experts on the meaning of the name, on pain of
circularity’ (2002, 118). Thus, to be capable of identifying the same indi-
viduals as specialists, a speaker must be able to identify specialists in light
1 The expectation is consistent with the possibility that, in response to a question or
conversation on the subject of Feynman, someone might ask: “Who is ‘Feynman’?” The
speaker evidently knows nothing about Feynman; certainly not that he is a famous physicist.
The speaker’s use of the name is significantly complicated, however, by the fact that the
individual to whom the earlier speaker had intended to refer is the subject of her question.
The question’s answer is obvious if and only if we know to whom the earlier speaker had
intended “Feynman” to refer—whether that speaker had used the name correctly is imma-
terial. The name thus being mentioned, rather than used, we mark its occurrence as a
quotation.
2 The difficulty is equally applicable to a variation on Strawson’s suggestion: “[W]e can
specify the property [non-experts] associate with the word ‘quark’. It is having the property
the group of users of the word ‘quark’ that they are borrowing from associate with the word
‘quark’” (Jackson 1998a, 210). Similarly, see Jackson 1998b, 40, “Felipe Alou”; Chalmers
2002, 171, “Feynman”; and Chalmers 2012, 282, “Gödel.”
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of what he or she already knows about the referent. Critically, Cicero/
Feynman suggests that the sort of properties we expect name users to
attribute to the referent allow them to characterize the relevant expertise.
Recall Cicero/Feynman’s indication that a name user at least attributes
to the referent the property of distinction in a particular field. The attribu-
tion presupposes knowledge of what distinguishes the field and, by
extension, those who work in it. Thus, the name users who attribute to
Feynman only the property of achievement in science may identify
scientists. Scientists, in turn, attribute unique scientific achievements to
Feynman, attributions to which we expect such speakers to defer.3 Like-
wise, in the event that two famous scientists happened to be called
“Feynman” we would expect a given name’s users to attribute a subfield of
achievement sufficient to distinguish its referent. Cicero/Feynman’s dis-
closure that even the most ignorant name user can identify specialists just
in light of what he or she knows about its referent implies that every name
user is capable of identifying the same individual as its most informed
users.
To contradict descriptivism by way of ignorant name use, Kripke must
identify name users who know too little about the referent to be capable
of identifying the same individual as the name’s most informed users.
Instead, Cicero/Feynman reveals that we expect a name user to know
enough about the referent to identify expertise on the relevant individual.
Of course, even a name’s most informed users might be mistaken about
the referent. If name users may be mistaken in every unique property they
attribute, the properties that identify the term’s referent are not the subject
of an agreement. Kripke’s second experiment is thought to confirm the
antecedent.
Gödel/Jonah: Mistaken Name Users?
Taking Cicero/Feynman to show that name users may be uninformed,
Kripke provides a second experiment to show that they may be misin-
formed. To contradict descriptivism, the experiment must reveal that even
a name’s most informed users could be mistaken in every unique property
they attribute. Kripke describes two scenarios, one fictional: “In the
case of Gödel that’s practically the only thing many people have heard
about him—that he discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic. Does
it follow that whoever discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic is
the referent of Gödel? Imagine the following blatantly fictional situa-
tion. . . . Suppose that Gödel was not in fact the author of this theorem. A
man named ‘Schmidt’, whose body was found in Vienna under mysterious
3 Even speakers who think that “Einstein’s most famous achievement was the invention
of the atomic bomb” (Kripke 1980, 85), attribute a field of achievement to whose practition-
ers we expect them to defer.
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circumstances many years ago, actually did the work in question. His friend
Gödel somehow got hold of the manuscript and it was thereafter attributed
to Gödel” (1980, 83–84). All we have heard about Gödel is that he produced
the proof of incompleteness. Intuitively, however, “Gödel” does not denote
the author of the theorem: “If a Gödelian fraud were exposed, Gödel would
no longer be called ‘the author of the incompleteness theorem’ but he would
still be called ‘Gödel’” (Kripke 1980, 87).
Kripke’s second scenario concerns the prophet Jonah. Taking the
Bible’s Book of Jonah to be apocryphal, Kripke notes: “If I had a suitable
[history] book along with me I could quote out of it: ‘Jonah, the son of
Amittai, was a real prophet, however such and such and such.’ There are
independent reasons for thinking this was not a pure legend about an
imaginary character but about a real character” (1980, 67). Though it
transpires that the fish-based tale told by the Book of Jonah is untrue, it is
untrue of Jonah; the Book of Jonah just led us to mistake his properties.
Attending to Kripke’s presentation of the scenarios, we discover a
problematic ambiguity, one replicated in survey vignettes.4 Usually, if we
believe that someone achieved something, it is because we think we have
reliable evidence, notably, a source that has a particular individual in
mind. Ascription of a unique achievement by a particular source is itself a
property, leading to our attribution to the individual of two properties, the
achievement and its ascription. Kripke’s presentation is silent, however, as
to whether speakers believe that they have reliable evidence of the achieve-
ment’s authorship and thus ascribe to the referent the unique property of
being the person attributed therewith by a particular source. In the case of
Kripke’s Gödel, it is unclear whether we attribute authorship of the proof
because we take a publication or diary to credibly ascribe it to a particular
person. If so, we may correct past statements, for example, “Gödel proved
incompleteness,” simply because Gödel, the guy credited with proving
incompleteness, did no such thing. Similarly, in the case of Kripke’s
Jonah, it is unclear whether we say, “Jonah did not enter a fish” simply
because Jonah, the guy who was the subject of the Book of Jonah, was
incapable of such feats.
Kripke later adjusts the Jonah scenario so that our only references to
Jonah are those contained in the Book of Jonah itself. But this adjustment
merely draws attention to the significance of the belief of name users that
the author of the Book of Jonah had a particular individual in mind: “The
evidence for the historicity of Jonah comes from an independent reference
to him in II Kings; but such evidence could have been available in the
absence of any such other references—e.g., evidence that all Hebrew
legends were about actual personages” (Kripke 1980, 67). If for every
other Hebrew legend we have independent evidence that it was invented
4 See, e.g., those deployed in Machery et al. 2004; Lam 2010; Machery 2011; Livengood
and Systema 2011; and Machery 2012; and suggested in Devitt 2011.
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about a historical personage, we may take it that the Book of Jonah was
similarly about a real person. However, precisely by accepting this infer-
ence, speakers would attribute to Jonah the property of being the guy who
is the subject of the Book of Jonah. If so, then, notwithstanding the
invention of the fish-based tale and the lack of any other reference to him,
name users are not mistaken in every unique property they attribute to
Jonah. To permit the scenarios to show that name users can be so mis-
taken, their presentation must exclude our attribution to speakers of
reliable evidence of the relevant achievement’s authorship or of its attribu-
tion to a particular individual. Suitably adjusted, however, the scenarios
fail to reveal that name users may be mistaken in every unique property
that they attribute.
Imagine again that the only references to Jonah are those contained in
the Book of Jonah itself. Should we discover evidence that Hebrew
legends were never written about actual personages, we would not declare,
“Jonah never visited a fish’s belly” or “The Jonah of the book never
existed.” Instead we would say, “The Book of Jonah is a pure legend” or
“There was no ‘Jonah.’” It appears, thus, that should speakers not at least
ascribe the property of being the subject of the Book of Jonah, we would
not treat attributions of properties to “Jonah” as potentially mistaken.
Equally, it would not seem to matter that someone was the subject of the
Book of Jonah, if speakers did not actually ascribe the property. Thus,
should it transpire that a folkloric figure had originally featured in a story
composed about a particular peasant, we would not start to correct credu-
lous children by saying, “Merlin was no magician.” We would continue to
say, “He’s not a real person.”
Adjusting Kripke’s Gödel scenario produces a similar result. Say we
lacked any credible attribution of the proof of incompleteness. Were we to
learn that the proof, traditionally attributed to the mysterious Gödel,
was in fact the work of the mathematician, Hans Hahn, we would not
announce, “A Gödelian fraud has been exposed” or “The Gödel of the
proof does not exist.” Rather, we would simply treat “Gödel” as just
another name for Hahn. The headlines in learned journals would read,
“Gödel is Hahn!” A close actual parallel concerns the name of the mys-
terious author of the Iliad.
Recall the Homeric Question—that of the authorship of the oldest
extant works in the Western canon. Though the classical Greeks were
not credited with attributing authorship to any particular individual,
“Homer” was for centuries taken to denote the poems’ unique historical
author. Modern Homeric scholarship has found indications that the
poems were in fact the product of a long oral tradition. Were those
scholars who find these indications compelling inclined to assert, “Homer
did not write the epics,” the name would possess a referent about whose
unique properties speakers may be wholly mistaken, redeeming Kripke’s
strategy. As it happens, such scholars do not say such things. To the
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contrary, they construct theories of the reference of “Homer” designed to
preserve the truth of the statement “Homer wrote the Iliad.”5 Thus, it has
been observed that “[a]rguments in favour of one or the other option
[on whether ‘Homer’ is a proper name or a collective noun] tend to be
based . . . on views about the Homeric Question” (Graziosi 2002, 53).
Should it somehow transpire that the ancient Athenian legislator Draco
wrote the poems, scholars would presumably cease to argue that “Homer”
is a noun. After all, Homer wrote the Iliad.
To contradict descriptivism, Gödel/Jonah must reveal that even a
name’s most informed users could be mistaken in every unique property
they attribute. However, just like the treatment of “Homer” in actual
scholarship, the experiment, properly interpreted, fails to do so. We
observed that the vignettes used in survey versions of Gödel/Jonah repli-
cate the ambiguity that confounds Kripke’s interpretation of the experi-
ment. It follows that the culturally diverse survey response cannot be
attributed to divergent intuition ahead of divergent understandings of the
scenario. Current fieldwork thus fails to show that intuition is an unreli-
able basis for discerning reference.
Conclusion
As the debate about Kripke’s thought experiments grows in complexity, it
remains commonly assumed that, granted Kripkean intuitions, they show
only how little speakers need to know. This article challenges that assump-
tion. We find that, properly interpreted, Cicero/Feynman reveals that
every name user knows enough to be capable of identifying the same
individual as its most informed users. Similarly, we find that Kripke’s
presentation of Gödel/Jonah, replicated in surveys, is ambiguous as to the
existence of reliable evidence of the relevant achievement’s authorship or
of its attribution to a particular individual. Disambiguated, it fails to
disclose the intuition that name users may be mistaken in every unique
property they attribute.
Properly interpreted, then, Kripke’s experiments are consistent with the
purposes for which philosophers make claims about who and what terms
refer to: to establish what a good theory of reference ought to explain, and
to uncover platitudes that distinguish the phenomenon of interest. First,
we find that survey evidence against the objectivity of intuition, the basis
on which philosophers determine such claims, is flawed. Second, we find
that Kripke’s intuitions are in fact consistent with the theory of reference
underlying the appeal to platitude, namely, that the properties that iden-
tify a term’s referent are the subject of an implicit agreement.
5 E.g., Graziosi 2002, 53, “a symbolic figure, the embodiment of epic poetry at large”;
Nagy 1996, 90, “a metaphor that pictures the crafting of the ultimate chariot-wheel by the
ultimate carpenter or ‘joiner’”; and Durante 1957 (an assembly of poets).
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